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I.  INTRODUCTION
Dean Choper, like virtually everyone who has thought about the
religion  clauses,  finds  the  Supreme  Court's  treatment  of religion
clause issues unsatisfactory. Although I share that judgment, I be-
lieve that some of Dean  Choper's points need  elaboration  and cri-
tique. In particular, his treatment of the role of purpose in religion
clause jurisprudence  is insufficiently  sensitive to variations in con-
text,  and  his  discussion  of  the  tension  between  the  clauses  is
incomplete.
II. COERCION  AND  PURPOSE  IN  THE  JURISPRUDENCE  OF  THE
RELIGION  CLAUSES
Many observers  commenting  on the Supreme  Court's decisions
regarding voluntary prayer in the public schools appear uncomfort-
able with the Court's simple view that voluntary prayers constitute
an establishment of religion. They seem concerned that few people
would object to a truly voluntary  system of prayer, feeling that if
children  can just refrain from praying if they do not want to, why
should  the  Constitution  be  interpreted  to  bar  a  system  under
which children who do want to pray are given an organized oppor-
tunity  to  do  so?  The  objection  to  so-called  voluntary  prayer  in
public  schools,  however,  is  the  suspicion  that  such  organized
prayers  really are  not voluntary.1  Thus, coercion  becomes  an  im-
portant part of the analysis  of establishment  clause  questions.
At first this conclusion appears  anomalous. The first amendment
contains  a provision  that on its face  deals with coercion-the  free
*  Professor of Law,  Georgetown  University.
1.  I put aside Justice  Stewart's  position  concerning  this  issue, which  would have  recog-
nized the possibility of coercion  in this setting, but would have placed the burden  of estab-
lishing that coercion existed on those challenging the practice. See Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374  U.S.  203,  318  (1963)  (Stewart,  J., dissenting).WILLIAM  AND  MARY  LAW  REVIEW
exercise  clause. If the pressure  to participate  in prayer  is substan-
tial  enough,  the  practice  would  violate  that  clause.  Why  should
pressure that is insufficient to create a free  exercise violation  none-
theless  be  relevant  to  determining  whether  the  establishment
clause  has been violated?
Dean  Choper  offers  an  analysis  that  makes  coercion  relevant
under both clauses. To make out an establishment clause violation,
one must show that the practice  at issue coerces-or compromises
or influences  religious beliefs  in a way that endangers  religious lib-
erty-and that the practice has a religious  purpose. To make  out a
free  exercise  violation,  one  must  show that  the  practice  at  issue
coerces  and that it does not serve an overriding secular  purpose. I
see two general  difficulties  with this  analysis.
A.  The Analysis of Coercion
The  first difficulty  involves the  definition  of coercion.  Coercion,
compromise, and  influence are  troubling, in Dean  Choper's analy-
sis, because they can threaten religious liberty. In particular, Dean
Choper  emphasizes  that the state coerces  individuals  into making
tax  payments,  and  that  this  practice  violates  the  establishment
clause  when the taxes are  used to  support churches. Dean  Choper
relies  on  abundant  historical  evidence  to  support  his  conclusion
that even the most modest tax support  of programs  with religious
purposes violates  the establishment  clause. As Madison  wrote, the
expenditure of only three pence  of tax money to support religion is
a matter  of concern.2
The  extraction  of  money  from  taxpayers  certainly  is  coercive,
but why does this sort of coercion  threaten religious  liberty? Dean
Choper  rejects  the  argument  that  coercion  of this  sort threatens
religious  liberty  because  it  causes  discomfort  or  offense.  What  is
left is the fact that, by taking money from individuals and using it
for religious purposes, the government makes it relatively more dif-
ficult for  those individuals  to use  their remaining  money for  pur-
poses  that they  deem  more  worthy. Their  wealth  having  dimin-
ished, the individuals have less discretionary money to use for such
purposes.
2.  Madison,  A Memorial and Remonstrance (circa June 20,  1785),  reprinted in  2 WRIT-
INGS  OF  JAMES  MADISON  186 (G.  Hunt ed.  1901).
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It is not obvious, however, that this definition is sufficient to ac-
count  for  what  ought  to  be  troubling  in  certain  interactions  be-
tween religion and government. Most  obviously, it seems to divert
attention  from  the  important  aspects  of Lynch  v.  Donnelly,'  in
which  the Supreme  Court  found that municipal  sponsorship  of a
creche does not violate the establishment clause, to make the deci-
sion depend entirely on the modest amount of tax funds that were
spent in support of the creche.4 Dean  Choper's formulation  would
make  this  tax  support the  key to  a  finding  of an  establishment
clause  violation.  I would  not have  been  unhappy  with the  result
that this analysis  would have dictated in Lynch, but I have to say
that something rather more  important than the use of tax money
was  wrong with the  City  of Pawtucket's  behavior  in that  case.  If
Dean  Choper's  theory  would find  Pawtucket's  behavior, tax  sup-
port  aside,  offensive  without  making that  offense  relevant  to the
constitutional  issue, something  is wrong with the theory.
In  addition,  to the  extent  that  coercion  affects  liberty  by  re-
stricting  opportunities  to use  discretionary wealth, Dean  Choper's
theory does not seem to take account of what might be called "in-
stitutional coercion."  Institutional coercion exists when the govern-
ment creates a set of institutions, none of which individually  have
a religious purpose but all of which together create  incentives that
influence  or, more strongly, coerce choice in religious matters. This
phenomenon  probably  has  as  much  of  an  effect  on  discretionary
choices  as does the restriction  of income, and therefore it probably
ought to be incorporated  into an analysis like Dean Choper's. Un-
fortunately,  an  analysis  of institutional  coercion  shows  how  diffi-
cult it is  to link  the  coercion  of tax  payments  to restrictions  on
religious  liberty.
Two  examples  are  prominent  in  discussions  of  the  religion
clauses. Supporters of public aid to religion have asserted that the
government's system of subsidizing secular education  in the public
schools without subsidizing religious education, coupled with its re-
quirement  that children  attend  schools,  has  coercive  effects,  and
3.  465  U.S.  668  (1984).
4.  For  a  generation,  one  criterion  for  an  acceptable  constitutional  theory  has  been
whether that theory explains why the Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S.  483  (1954), was correct. In my view, a criterion  for an acceptable theory of the religion
clauses  is whether that theory explains why the Court's  decision in Lynch was  wrong.
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that a modest  accommodation  such  as  allowing  organized  prayers
in  public schools  is necessary  to offset  this institutional  coercion.
Similarly,  feminists  have  argued  that the  government's  system  of
financing most medical  services,  coupled with its refusal to finance
abortion  services,  has  coercive  effects-in  this instance,  the effect
of  inducing  women  to  behave  in ways  consistent  with  particular
moral-religious  views,  which,  because  of the psychological  mecha-
nism that leads  people to reduce cognitive  dissonance,  thereby  in-
duces  them to  hold those  views.
I do not wish to defend the view that institutional  coercion  ex-
ists in either of these instances. Rather, I merely want to show that
institutional  coercion  is  a  phenomenon  that  an  analysis  that  in-
vokes  coercion  ought to  address. Any interpretation  of "coercion"
that  finds  coercion  in  modest  tax  support  for  religious  activities
ought to have room for some form of institutional  coercion as well.
The difficulty, of course,  is that the network of governmental  activ-
ities  is so  dense that every practice  could be subject to a powerful
claim  of institutional  coercion.  In  that event,  the  concept  would
not be able  to play  any role in deciding religion  clause  questions.
B. The Analysis of Purpose
The second  general  difficulty with  Dean  Choper's  theory arises
from the other element of his analysis. His distinction between the
two clauses would  collapse if a religious  purpose were routinely in-
ferred from the fact that a practice had only a modest secular pur-
pose. At first glance, that inference probably would not be made  in
most cases. After all, goals like preserving the fiscal stability of so-
cial insurance  schemes surely are substantial secular purposes, and
they seem  largely unrelated  to  religious purposes.
A slight shift in perspective  may make  the problem  more  diffi-
cult. Suppose one  asks, not whether the program  as a whole has a
secular  purpose that  is not insubstantial, but whether the  refusal
to exempt sincere  religious believers  from  the program has such  a
secular purpose.'  As far as I can tell, the only such purpose availa-
ble  for  most  programs  is  the  administrative  difficulty  of  making
5.  See  L.  TRIBE,  AMERICAN  CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW  855  (1978)  (criticizing  "the  error of
equating the state's interest in denying  a religious  exemption  with the state's usually much
greater interest in maintaining the underlying rule or program for unexceptionable  cases").
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determinations  of  sincerity.'  Moreover,  for  many  of  those  pro-
grams, a purpose to burden or to advance religion  would be infera-
ble from  a  state's failure  to  set up an  appropriate  administrative
mechanism  to sort the sincere from the insincere.  Cases like Sher-
bert v.  Verner7  certainly  seem  like  legislative  oversights,  or, per-
haps  more precisely, willful  misinterpretations  of ambiguous  stat-
utes  in situations in which the motivation for the misreading may
well  be hostility to the religious  claim.8  One  might treat the prob-
lem  as  susceptible  to a constitutional  "clear  statement"  analysis:
perhaps  legislatures  do  occasionally  inadvertently  fail  to  provide
appropriate  administrative mechanisms  to avoid  coercing religious
belief or action. The courts should point out these mistakes to leg-
islatures. But if a legislature  persists in refusing to  provide an ex-
emption  from a secular  regulation,  even  though  providing the  ex-
emption  would  entail  no  significant  costs,  the  inference  of  a
religious  purpose would seem rather strong.9  If this analysis  is cor-
rect, Dean  Choper's proposal ends  up not truly distinguishing the
6.  One  common objection  to such exemptions  is that people  have incentives  to claim ex-
emptions  from  certain  programs,  such  as  taxing  systems, while  they lack  such  incentives
when  other programs  are involved.  This is  one basis upon  which Wisconsin  v. Yoder,  406
U.S.  205  (1972)  (considering the  need for an exemption from a state's compulsory education
requirement  for  adolescents  to  accommodate  individuals  with  religious  objections  to  such
education),  can be distinguished  from United States v. Lee, 455 U.S.  127 (1982)  (considering
the need for an exemption  from  compulsory participation  in the Social Security  system to
accommodate  individuals with religious objections to the system).  In addition to the fact, to
which Dean Choper directs our attention, that the person  seeking an exemption  in Lee also
disclaimed any intention to seek  social insurance benefits,  and  thus might have lacked the
asserted  incentive,  the  situation  in  Lee  also  involved  the  difficult  determination  of the
sincerity  of the claimant.  Thus, the fundamental  problem  is  not one  of identifying incen-
tives,  but  one  of determining  sincerity.  In  other  contexts,  the  Court  has  expressed  no
qualms about the ability of the  government to determine sincerity. See, e.g., United  States
v. Seeger,  380 U.S.  163  (1965).
7. 374 U.S.  398  (1963).
8.  In this  connection  one  should  note,  as the Court  did  in Sherbert, that prior to  the
decision  of the  South  Carolina  Supreme  Court in  Sherbert no  court had  interpreted  its
state's unemployment  benefit statutes to bar payments to people  in Sherbert's  position. Id.
at 407 n.7.
9.  The alternative  view  of the  problem  is that Sherbert and Yoder  are aberrations  and
that the  free  exercise clause  requires  no accommodation  to religious beliefs in secular pro-
grams. Under  this view, however, it is difficult to  see what the free  exercise  clause  contrib-
utes to the Constitution that the free speech clause does not. See Marshall, Solving the Free
Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression, 67 MINN. L. REV.  545  (1983).WILLIAM  AND  MARY  LAW  REVIEW
two  religion  clauses:  both  require  coercion,  and  both  require  the
presence  of a religious  or  anti-religious  purpose.1 0
III. ALTERNATIVES  TO  THE  USE  OF  PURPOSE  IN  RELIGION  CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE
One  difficulty  with  discussions  of  the  religion  clauses  is  that
commentators  have  been  captivated  by  the  attractions  of  the
three-part  test  in  Lemon  v.  Kurtzman."  Not that  people  agree
that  all three  prongs are  equally sensible,  that the  Court  has ap-
plied the test in  a coherent  way,  or  even that the test  should be
regarded  as anything more than a sensible way to start one's think-
ing about the religion clauses; but people do tend to take the test's
reliance  on "purpose"  as  canonical. I believe  that this is mislead-
ing. Although the Court has invoked the "purpose"  prong in a rela-
tively undifferentiated way, it in fact uses  a more complex  analyti-
cal scheme.  In addition, treating "purpose"  as a unitary concept  is
unlikely to provide helpful normative guidance in resolving religion
clause  problems.
Perhaps  our  understanding  would  be  deepened  by  expressly
drawing  attention  to  other  areas  of  constitutional  law  in  which
"purpose"  plays  a role,  such as the dormant commerce  clause  and
the equal protection  clause.1 2 Both of those other areas, for  exam-
ple,  provide  useful  analogues  to  the  problem  in  Larson v.  Va-
lente,1 3  the  case  involving  Minnesota's  selective  effort to  regulate
solicitation  by  members  of  the  Unification  Church.  That  case
seems to  involve a classic  gerrymander-that  is, a facially-neutral
statute with inclusions and  exclusions that give rise to an irresisti-
ble inference  of an intent, or purpose, to disadvantage a particular
10.  If the establishment  clause protects religious liberty to the extent that the  free  exer-
cise clause does, and the free  exercise  clause protects religious  liberty to the extent that the
free speech  clause does, see supra note 9, one wonders what James Madison thought he was
doing in drafting the religion  clauses of the first amendment.
11.  403  U.S.  602,  612-13  (1971).
12.  See Hunter v. Underwood,  471 U.S.  222 (1985)  (equal protection);  Hunt v.  Washing-
ton State Apple  Advertising  Comm'n, 432 U.S.  333  (1977)  (commerce  clause).
13.  456  U.S.  228  (1982).
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group. 4  Unlike Dean Choper, then, I believe that ordinary purpose
analysis is perfectly  acceptable  in Larson.
Nevertheless, I agree with Dean Choper concerning the existence
of a special  category  of  problems  for which,  as  he puts it,  "strict
scrutiny" is necessary. Dean Choper would include statutes dealing
expressly with religion in that category. As I have suggested, virtu-
ally  all  statutes dealing  expressly  with  religion  are  susceptible  to
ordinary purpose  analysis, but another sort of problem, illustrated
by Epperson v.  Arkansas15  and  other  evolution/creation  science
cases,' 6  exists. These cases involve statutes that deal expressly with
the curriculum  of the public schools, rather than with religion, yet
everyone knows that religion is the real issue. I suggest that these
cases  involve  what  might  be  called  "religion-sensitive"  subjects,
and it may be that the best way to understand Epperson is to view
it  as  invoking  a  rule that statutes  dealing  with  religion-sensitive
subjects  must survive  strict scrutiny.1
Difficulties would  arise with this category as well-most notably,
the  difficulty  in  determining  what  counts  as  a  religion-sensitive
subject.  Everyone  probably  would  agree  that  creation  science  is
such  a  subject,  but  what  about  abortion?'8  More  generally,  the
14.  Compare  the similar  expressions  about motivation  relied on  in Hunt v.  Washington
State  Apple  Advertising  Comm'n,  432  U.S.  333,  352  (1977)  ("glaring"  statement  by state
official  regarding his desire to "have the sentiment from our apple producers since they were
mainly  responsible for this legislation  being passed"), and Larson, 456 U.S.  at 255  (legisla-
tor's  statement that he was "not  sure why we're so hot to regulate the Moonies anyway").
15.  393 U.S.  97  (1968).
16.  See, e.g., McLean v. Arkansas Bd.  of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982), aff'd,
723 F.2d 45  (8th Cir.  1983).
17.  At least this avoids the  notorious  difficulties that arise when one tries to understand
these  cases in more conventional  terms, as  Justice Black's concurring opinion in Epperson
made abundantly  clear.  See 393 U.S.  at 113-14  (Black, J., concurring).
18.  Professor  Tribe  initially argued  that statutes restricting  the availability of abortion
were unconstitutional  because they were motivated largely by a particular,  and particularly
religious,  view  about  when  human  life  begins.  See  Tribe,  The  Supreme  Court  1972
Term-Foreword:  Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARv.
L. REV.  1, 18-25  (1973).  "[O]n  reflection,"  however, Professor Tribe concluded that this view
"give[s]  too little  weight  to the value  of allowing  religious  groups  freely  to  express  their
convictions in the political process."  L. TRIBE, supra note 5, at 928 (footnote omitted). Pro-
fessor Tribe's  initial  suggestion  was  that  the  religious  component  of the  controversy  re-
quired  courts  to  remit the abortion  decision  to pregnant  women;  this Comment  suggests
that the religion-sensitive  nature  of the issue  authorizes  courts to determine  on their own
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subjects  that can be termed religion-sensitive  are  likely to  change
substantially  over time, as society becomes  attuned to different as-
pects  of  religious  belief  and  conflict.  Drawing
constitutional  doctrine in this manner  makes it unstable from the
beginning, which may not be  desirable, yet cases such as Epperson
do  seem  to  involve  something  special  that  is  not  captured  by  a
more straightforward  analysis  of legislative  purpose.
Another set of cases not readily susceptible to analysis under the
ordinary Lemon  approach to purpose  involves  what Dean  Choper
calls  "deeply  ingrained  practices"  such  as legislative  prayer. Once
again,  however,  I  believe  that  the  difficulties  arise  from  a  mis-
guided effort to use the Lemon approach, rather than from difficul-
ties inherent  in the  quest for  purpose.  Years  ago,  Mark  DeWolfe
Howe argued  that such  practices, which  he called  "de  facto estab-
lishments,"  had to be analyzed  in a special  way.19  These  practices
plainly have religious purposes, and no good is done by pretending,
as the Court  came  close to doing  in Lynch, that the ordinary un-
derstanding of "purpose"  somehow allows  a holding that the prac-
tices  do  not  have  religious  purposes.2°  As  Howe  suggested,  how-
ever,  it  is  unclear  why  the  establishment  clause  should  be
interpreted to prohibit  these  de facto  establishments.  The  Court's
recent behavior  confirms  that, whatever  the  doctrinal rubric, such
practices  are  almost  certain  to  be  found  constitutional  anyway.
One  might  as  well  candidly  acknowledge,  in  our  doctrinal  struc-
ture, that de  facto  establishments are constitutionally permissible.
As before, this suggestion  does not resolve all problems; one still
must decide  what makes  a practice  a de facto  establishment.  One
characteristic,  suggested  by Dean  Choper,  is  that  de  facto  estab-
lishments  have a  long pedigree.2'  One legitimately  may  ask,  how-
ever,  how  long  is  long  enough?  A  casual  survey  of the  citizenry
probably  would reveal  that most people  believe  that public  cele-
brations  of Christmas date  back  to medieval  times. Justice  Bren-
19.  M.  HOWE,  THE GARDEN  AND  THE  WILDERNESS  11-12  (1965).
20.  See, e.g., Lynch  v. Donnelly,  465 U.S.  668, 679  (1984)  (creche  must be evaluated  "in
its context"); id. at 727 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (Court "relegate[s]"  creche "to the role of
a neutral harbinger of the holiday season, useful for commercial  purposes, but devoid of any
inherent  meaning").
21.  Cf. Marsh v. Chambers,  463 U.S. 783 (1983)  (upholding use  of chaplains in legislatures
because  of historically unique  record  of acceptance  of this  practice).
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nan's dissent in Lynch, however,  demonstrated that in the United
States  such  celebrations  are  only  slightly  more  than  a  century
old. 2  Similarly,  the  practice  of  organized  prayer  in  the  public
schools probably seemed well-established  in the early 1960's, but it
too was  then barely a hundred  years old.
Another candidate  for a characteristic  to identify de facto estab-
lishments  is that the religious  content  of de facto  establishments,
while undeniably present, is relatively  slight. Sunday closing laws,
or statutes  requiring  businesses  to open  no  earlier  than noon  on
Sundays, the time when church  services traditionally  end, do have
some  connection to religion, but not much. Public  celebrations  of
Christmas  have  become  relatively  secularized,  though,  as  Lynch
shows, they still contain  some religious  elements.25
One advantage  of developing  a differentiated  approach to ques-
tions  of  purpose  under  the  religion  clauses,  which  identifies
religion-sensitive  topics, de  facto  establishments,  and perhaps  ad-
ditional categories,  is that this approach can direct attention to the
operation of the political process  on matters of religion. The ordi-
nary operation of politics these  days  does not seem likely  to  pro-
duce  legislation  that  "threatens  those  consequences  which  the
Framers  deeply  feared, '24  because  pluralist politics  operate  as  to
religion  much as  they do  to any  other subject. Differences  among
religious  denominations'  views about the proper stance  of govern-
ment toward religion, which range from  advocacy  of strict separa-
tion to advocacy  of benevolent neutrality and beyond, make it dif-
ficult to achieve the sort of consensus on particular  programs that
is necessary before a legislature will act. This is particularly true in
the  present  day  when,  in  addition  to the  denominational  differ-
22.  465  U.S.  at 720-23  (Brennan, J., dissenting).
23.  See  id.  at 685-86.  One  difficulty with  using  this characteristic  to  identify de  facto
establishments  is that, as an initial  matter, one  would think that something like  the  New
York  Regents' prayer  in Engel  v. Vitale,  370 U.S.  421  (1962),  would have  such  slight reli-
gious  content as  to  be  a  de facto  establishment  under this approach.  The content  of the
prayer may have been almost nonreligious,  but the fact that it was a prayer probably gave it
sufficient  religious content to eliminate the possibility of classifying the activity as a permis-
sible  de facto  establishment.
24.  Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 236 (1963)  (Brennan, J., concurring);
see  also Wolman  v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 263 (1977)  (opinion of Powell, J.) ("[W]e are quite
far  removed  from  the  dangers  that prompted  the  Framers  to  include the  Establishment
Clause  in the Bill  of Rights."  (footnote  omitted)).
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ences, a strong and highly  secularized  elite, represented,  for exam-
ple,  by  scholars  of  constitutional  law,  oppose  substantial
interaction  between  government  and  religion.25  Taken  together,
these  aspects  of the  political  process  probably  will  prevent  any-
thing more than the  most innocuous  and ritualized invocations  of
religion from  emerging  from  the political process.
This  rosy  picture,  of  course,  must  be  qualified.  In  our  federal
system,  denominations  that  favor  substantial interaction  between
government  and  religion  may have  such  control  over the  political
process  in  some  places  that pluralism  does  not function  particu-
larly  well.  In  addition,  some  practices,  perhaps  typified  by  the
creche  at  issue in Lynch, may  be  innocuous  to a very substantial
proportion  of the population  but deeply  offensive  to a proportion
small  enough to be dealt out of the  pluralist bargaining process.
On the level of strict analysis, I believe that these arguments are
answerable  in several ways. 26  One response, however,  is more gen-
eral  and  more  important.  The  qualifications  enumerated  above
suggest  that, while the  general  operation of the  pluralist political
process  on  matters  of  religion  may  be  acceptable,  the  process
sometimes  breaks  down.  Adopting  Vincent  Blasi's  image,  the
courts perhaps should adopt a "pathological  perspective"  of the re-
ligion  clauses,27  developing  a doctrine that provides the maximum
support for religious liberty when these serious malfunctions occur.
25.  An  analogy may  be  drawn between  this  issue  and discussions  of Congress'  power  to
restrict  the  Supreme  Court's  jurisdiction,  in  which  the  strong  scholarly  consensus  sup-
porting  limitations  on  that  power  acts  as  a  political  force  impeding  the  enactment  of
jurisdiction-restricting  statutes. See Tushnet & Jaff,  Why the Debate over Congress' Power
to Restrict the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts is Unending, 72 GEO.  L.J.  1311,  1325-27
(1984).
26.  For example,  one  could  redescribe  the  assertedly troubling  exclusion  from the  bar-
gaining table as one  dimension of the diversity that characterizes  our federal  system, which
is usually considered a virtue. Those who are dealt out of the hand can move to other, more
hospitable jurisdictions, and the threat that they will do so gives  incentives to the dominant
majority not to ignore the minority completely. Further, the minority that is ignored locally
need not be ignored at the next higher level of the jurisdictional structure. People harmed
by city ordinances,  for example,  can appeal  to state  legislatures for relief, and the fact that
they are not important enough  to deal with on the local level  does not mean that they lack
sufficient  political resources  to strike  a deal at the state  or national  level.
27.  Blasi, The Pathological  Perspective  and the First  Amendment, 85  COLUM.  L. REV. 449
(1985).
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This pathological  perspective,  however, has  two problems. First,
it imposes substantial costs on the courts. To preserve the possibil-
ity of invoking  a restrictive  doctrine  when it  is really needed, the
courts would have to invoke the doctrine under circumstances that
are, by definition, not pathological. At the least, this would appear
rather  silly, resulting in the deployment of big constitutional  guns
against  what  concededly  are  insubstantial  targets.  Second,  the
pathological  perspective  assumes  that the  courts'  insulation  from
the political process is great enough to ensure, even during times of
stress, that they will be sufficiently steadfast to enforce the restric-
tive doctrines.  Courts, however,  in many ways surely are  not that
different from other political institutions. To make the point most
crudely,  one  can  hardly  be  confident  about  the  Supreme  Court's
ability to stand up to political heat when, in a time when the Court
was  not  particularly  constrained  by  political  considerations,  it
managed to  decide Lynch  as it  did.
IV.  PURPOSE  AND  THE  ASSERTED  CONFLICT  BETWEEN  THE  RELIGION
CLAUSES
Dean Choper asserts,  as did Justice Stewart,"  that the Supreme
Court  has managed  to interpret the free exercise  clause  in  a way
that places  the clause in logical conflict with the Court's interpre-
tation of the establishment clause. In this way, too, Dean Choper is
beguiled  by a unitary  definition of purpose.
As an initial matter, one easily can define the religion clauses so
that they do not conflict. Suppose, for example, that the free exer-
cise  clause  is  interpreted  to  require,  under  some  circumstances,
that religious exemptions from secular  regulations be granted. One
then could  interpret the  establishment  clause to prohibit  all stat-
utes that have a religious purpose, except for statutes with the pur-
pose of accommodating  religion  in ways required  by the free exer-
cise  clause.  Surely the conflict that Dean  Choper discerns  occurs
only because he believes that the concept of purpose for establish-
ment  clause  purposes  cannot  be  subdivided  as  this  formulation
suggests.  No logical impediment  exists,  however, to the suggested
definition  of the clauses.
28.  Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.  398, 414  (Stewart, J., concurring).
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This suggestion  may have  practical  problems.  For example,  one
formulation  might  be  to  permit  under  the  establishment  clause
only those statutory accommodations that are required  by the free
exercise  clause,  and  to  hold  unconstitutional  all  other  efforts  to
promote  "free  exercise  values."  Under  this  formulation,  however,
legislatures  would  have  little  incentive  to  enact statutory  accom-
modations.  If they failed  to  enact a required  accommodation,  the
courts would  create  one, and if they enacted something  more than
what the  courts  would  require  independently,  their  efforts  would
go for naught.
This  problem  could  be  addressed  by  introducing  some  slight
flexibility into the  establishment  clause  standard,  which  could  be
interpreted  to  allow  legislatures  some  maneuvering  room  on  the
fringes of required accommodations. The courts then would uphold
statutory accommodations  that reasonably  promoted  free  exercise
values without unduly impairing establishment  clause values." 9  Re-
gardless  of how one  deals  with the  problems  of defining  precisely
the  relationship  between  the  religion  clauses,  however,  avoidance
of a logical conflict is simple enough, so long as one avoids thinking
that  a  single  concept  of  purpose  must  be  employed  to  analyze
problems  under both clauses.
IV. CONCLUSION
The jurisprudence  of the  religion  clauses  is  a  mess,  but not, I
think, for the reasons Dean  Choper gives. Dean Choper  is too con-
cerned about the way the concepts  of coercion and purpose operate
in that jurisprudence.  The  concerns,  as he has stated them, could
be  alleviated  by  developing  more  refined  definitions  of those  con-
cepts.  Indeed, I  have suggested that the jurisprudence  of the  reli-
gion  clauses  is  less  of a mess,  or  is  a different  sort of mess,  pre-
cisely because the Court has operative definitions  of those concepts
that differ  from Dean Choper's.  As  I  have argued  elsewhere,30  the
jurisprudence  of the  religion  clauses  is a  mess not because  we  do
29.  This  approach  is  consistent  with some  so-called  "remedial"  views  of Katzenbach  v.
Morgan,  384 U.S. 641 (1966).  See G. STONE,  L. SEIDMAN,  C. SUNSTEIN  & M. TUSHNET,  CONSTI-
TUTIONAL  LAW  239-41  (1986).
30.  Tushnet,  The  Constitution of Religion, 18  CONN.  L. REV.  701 (1986).
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not  understand  the  Constitution,  but  because  we  do  not  under-
stand  religion.